In August 2023, General Brice Oligui Nguema, hailing from Gabon’s Haut-Ogooué province, orchestrated a military coup that ousted President Ali Bongo Ondimba, ending the Bongo family’s decades-long rule. Following the coup, Nguema assumed the role of interim president and initiated constitutional reforms to facilitate his participation in the forthcoming presidential election scheduled for April 12, 2025.
This scenario draws parallels to Sierra Leone’s Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio, who, in January 1996, led a coup against his predecessor, Captain Valentine Strasser. Bio subsequently organized elections and handed over power to the democratically elected president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, in March 1996.
Similarly, Nigeria’s General Sani Abacha, who seized power in 1993, attempted to transition to civilian rule by orchestrating a self-succession plan but died in 1998 before realizing this ambition.
Unlike Bio and Abacha, Nguema has strategically amended Gabon’s constitution to permit his candidacy. The revised constitution, approved via a referendum in November 2024, extends the presidential term from five to seven years and replaces the prime minister’s role with that of a vice president. These changes have raised concerns among opposition figures and analysts, who view them as maneuvers to entrench military rule under the guise of democratic transition.
The upcoming election presents formidable challenges for Nguema. Notably, former Prime Minister Alain Claude Billie By Nze has declared his candidacy as an independent, signaling potential stiff competition.
The political landscape is further complicated by public skepticism regarding the military’s commitment to genuine democratic processes.
In Sierra Leone, Bio’s brief tenure as head of state culminated in a peaceful transition to civilian rule, a move that bolstered his political capital and paved the way for his eventual election as president in 2018.
Conversely, Abacha’s tenure was marred by human rights abuses and political repression, leading to international isolation and domestic unrest. His sudden death in 1998 forestalled his plans to perpetuate his rule through a controlled transition.
Nguema’s path diverges as he seeks to legitimize his rule through electoral means, a strategy contingent upon the perceived fairness of the electoral process and his ability to garner genuine public support. The international community’s scrutiny of Gabon’s political developments adds pressure to ensure that the elections are free, fair, and transparent.
The success of Nguema’s bid hinges on several factors: the credibility of the electoral process, the unity and effectiveness of the opposition, and the public’s perception of his leadership since the coup. While the constitutional amendments have cleared legal obstacles for his candidacy, they have also fueled narratives of democratic backsliding.
In conclusion, as Gabon approaches the 2025 elections, the critical question remains whether Nguema can navigate the complex interplay of legal frameworks, public opinion, and international expectations to secure a legitimate mandate. His ability to do is being questioned by the quality of oppositions he has to face in the next month elections.
The main question is will Nguema accept defeat if he loses at the poll. Some non governmental organisations and members of the international community believes that Nguema’ s ambition is a sensitive one and dangerous for democracy.
He is in charge of the military and it is hard to remember the last time a military leader conceeded defeat to a civilian in an election in Africa.
